

Chapter Consciousness And The Two Track Mind

I argue that conscious visual experience consists in a direct and noninferential grasp of the way one's current perceptual contact with the environment poises one to pursue various intentional plans, goals and projects. I show that such a view of visual consciousness is supported by current work in cognitive neuroscience, affords a compelling account of colour perception, and suggests a way to bridge the 'explanatory gap' between consciousness and the language of the natural sciences. In chapter 1, I examine the reasoning that leads to the appearance of an explanatory gap between the phenomenal and the physical in more detail, and set out the constraints on a solution that our discussion of the problem has imposed. I then sketch the two rival takes on the relationship between perception and action mentioned above - adjudicating between these two theories (and finding in favour of the action-space view) is the task of the next two chapters, and is a recurring theme throughout. Chapter 2 moves on to discuss some recent work in the neuropsychology of vision and what it might suggest about the functional role of conscious vision, and the first half of chapter 3 considers two puzzle cases concerning colour perception. Each of these discussions turns out to constitute a source of support for the actionspace view that visual perception consists in a grasp of the practical consequences of sensation, and the second half of chapter 3 sets out this view and responds to an initial range of questions and objections it might face. Chapter 4 illustrates our view via a discussion of colour perception, and chapter 5 discusses the type of grasp of practical consequences that is necessary for perceptual sensitivity to issue in conscious experience. By chapter 6, we are in a position to see how the action-space approach can help close the explanatory gap for phenomenal consciousness, and our final chapter sets out how I think this should be done. I conclude with a brief discussion of further questions and prospects for the action-space approach. A philosopher argues that we know little about our own inner lives. Do you dream in color? If you answer Yes, how can you be sure? Before you recount your vivid memory of a dream featuring all the colors of the rainbow, consider that in the 1950s researchers found that most people reported dreaming in black and white. In the 1960s, when most movies were in color and more people had color television sets, the vast majority of reported dreams contained color. The most likely explanation for this, according to the philosopher Eric Schwitzgebel, is not that exposure to black-and-white media made people misremember their dreams. It is that we simply don't know whether or not we dream in color. In *Perplexities of Consciousness*, Schwitzgebel examines various aspects of inner life (dreams, mental imagery, emotions, and other subjective phenomena) and argues that we know very little about our stream of conscious experience. Drawing broadly from historical and recent philosophy and psychology to examine such topics as visual perspective, and the unreliability of introspection, Schwitzgebel finds us singularly inept in our judgments about conscious experience.

This book presents an analytic investigation into the nature of cognitive reality. The author explores various manifestations of consciousness with rational and empirical rigor; he begins with more ordinary states such as thinking, sleeping, and dreaming and then continues on with more extraordinary states such as hypnosis, trance, psychedelic experiences, transcendence, and experiences associated with death. This comprehensive overview of altered states examines consciousness from the physiological, cognitive, and experiential points of view. Readers will gain from this text an enriched understanding of consciousness, reality, and the scientific endeavor. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2004 APA, all rights reserved).

This introductory text offers a comprehensive and easy-to-follow guide to cognitive neuroscience. Chapters cover all aspects of the field - the neural framework, sight, sound, consciousness, learning/memory, problem solving, speech, executive control, emotions, socialization and development - in a student-friendly format with extensive pedagogy and ancillaries to aid both the student and professor. Throughout the text, case studies and everyday examples are used to help students understand the more challenging aspects of the material. Written by two leading experts in the field, the text takes a unique thematic approach, guiding students along a clear path to understand the latest findings whether or not they have a background in neuroscience. Complete introduction to mind-brain science, written to be highly accessible to undergraduates with limited neuroscience training Richly illustrated with carefully selected color graphics to enhance understanding Enhanced pedagogy highlights key concepts for the student and aids in teaching - chapter outlines, study questions, glossary Ancillary support saves instructors time and facilitates learning - test questions, image collection, lecture slides, etc.

Hypnosis, amnesia, and immobility are three major therapeutic endpoints of general anesthesia. In one to two cases out of a thousand, hypnosis and amnesia are not achieved – often leaving a patient immobile but capable of experiencing and remembering intraoperative events. Awareness during general anesthesia is one of the most dreaded complications of surgery and is feared by patients and clinicians alike. Despite many advances in the field, there are also a number of unresolved questions that persist. Some of the difficulties in the detection and prevention of awareness during anesthesia relate to the underlying complexities of the neuroscientific basis of consciousness. *Consciousness, Awareness, and Anesthesia* is a multidisciplinary approach to both the scientific problem of consciousness and the clinical problem of awareness during general anesthesia. An international cadre of authors with expertise in anesthesiology, neurobiology, and philosophy provides a cutting-edge perspective. No other book on the subject has drawn from such a breadth of scholarship.

The second edition of *The Neurology of Consciousness* is a comprehensive update of this ground-breaking work on human consciousness, the first book in this area to summarize the neuroanatomical and functional underpinnings of consciousness by emphasizing a lesional approach offered by the study of neurological patients. Since the publication of the first edition in 2009, new methodologies have made consciousness much more accessible scientifically, and, in particular, the study of disorders, disruptions, and disturbances of consciousness has added tremendously to our understanding of the biological basis of human consciousness. The publication of a new edition is both critical and timely for continued understanding of the field of consciousness. In this critical and timely update, revised and new contributions by internationally renowned researchers—edited by the leaders in the field of consciousness research—provide a unique and comprehensive focus on human consciousness. The new edition of *The Neurobiology of Consciousness* will continue to be an indispensable resource for researchers and students working on the cognitive neuroscience of consciousness and related disorders, as well as for neuroscientists, psychologists, psychiatrists, and neurologists contemplating consciousness as one of the philosophical, ethical, sociological, political, and religious questions of our time. New chapters on the neuroanatomical basis of consciousness and short-term memory, and expanded coverage of comas and neuroethics, including the ethics of brain death The first comprehensive, authoritative collection to describe disorders of consciousness and how they are

used to study and understand the neural correlates of conscious perception in humans. Includes both revised and new chapters from the top international researchers in the field, including Christof Koch, Marcus Raichle, Nicholas Schiff, Joseph Fins, and Michael Gazzaniga

Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness, Second Edition, provides students and readers with an overview of the study of the human brain and its cognitive development. It discusses brain molecules and their primary function, which is to help carry brain signals to and from the different parts of the human body. These molecules are also essential for understanding language, learning, perception, thinking, and other cognitive functions of our brain. The book also presents the tools that can be used to view the human brain through brain imaging or recording. New to this edition are Frontiers in Cognitive Neuroscience text boxes, each one focusing on a leading researcher and their topic of expertise. There is a new chapter on Genes and Molecules of Cognition; all other chapters have been thoroughly revised, based on the most recent discoveries. This text is designed for undergraduate and graduate students in Psychology, Neuroscience, and related disciplines in which cognitive neuroscience is taught. New edition of a very successful textbook completely revised to reflect new advances, and feedback from adopters and students Includes a new chapter on Genes and Molecules of Cognition Student Solutions available at <http://www.baars-gage.com/> For Teachers: Rapid adoption and course preparation: A wide array of instructor support materials are available online including PowerPoint lecture slides, a test bank with answers, and eFlashcards on key concepts for each chapter. A textbook with an easy-to-understand thematic approach: in a way that is clear for students from a variety of academic backgrounds, the text introduces concepts such as working memory, selective attention, and social cognition. A step-by-step guide for introducing students to brain anatomy: color graphics have been carefully selected to illustrate all points and the research explained. Beautifully clear artist's drawings are used to 'build a brain' from top to bottom, simplifying the layout of the brain. For students: An easy-to-read, complete introduction to mind-brain science: all chapters begin from mind-brain functions and build a coherent picture of their brain basis. A single, widely accepted functional framework is used to capture the major phenomena. Learning Aids include a student support site with study guides and exercises, a new Mini-Atlas of the Brain and a full Glossary of technical terms and their definitions. Richly illustrated with hundreds of carefully selected color graphics to enhance understanding.

The Cambridge Handbook of Consciousness is the first of its kind in the field, and its appearance marks a unique time in the history of intellectual inquiry on the topic. After decades during which consciousness was considered beyond the scope of legitimate scientific investigation, consciousness re-emerged as a popular focus of research towards the end of the last century, and it has remained so for nearly 20 years. There are now so many different lines of investigation on consciousness that the time has come when the field may finally benefit from a book that pulls them together and, by juxtaposing them, provides a comprehensive survey of this exciting field. An authoritative desk reference, which will also be suitable as an advanced textbook.

This book aims to show that recent developments in neuroscience permit a defense of free will. Through language, human beings can escape strict biological determinism.

This 2003 book focuses on neuropsychiatric models of self-consciousness, set against introductory essays describing the philosophical, historical and psychological approaches.

New essays connecting recent scientific studies with traditional issues about the self explored by Descartes, Locke and Hume. Leading philosophers offer contrasting perspectives on the relation between consciousness and self-awareness, and the notion of personhood. Essential reading for philosophers, neuroscientists, cognitive scientists and psychologists.

Presenting state-of-the-art work on the conscious and unconscious processes involved in emotion, this integrative volume brings together leading psychologists, neuroscientists, and philosophers. Carefully organized, tightly edited chapters address such compelling questions as how bodily responses contribute to conscious experience, whether "unconscious emotion" exists, how affect is transmitted from one person to another, and how emotional responses are produced in the brain. Bringing a new level of coherence to lines of inquiry that often remain disparate, the book identifies key, cross-cutting ideas and themes and sets forth a cogent agenda for future research.

The conscious mind is life as we experience it; we see the world, feel our emotions and think our thoughts thanks to consciousness. This book provides an easy introduction to the foundations of consciousness; how can subjective consciousness be measured scientifically? What happens to the conscious mind and self when the brain gets injured? How does consciousness, our subjective self or soul, arise from the activities of the brain? Addressing the philosophical and historical roots of the problems alongside current scientific approaches to consciousness in psychology and neuroscience, Foundations of Consciousness examines key questions as well as delving deeper to look at altered and higher states of consciousness. Using student-friendly pedagogy throughout, the book discusses some of the most difficult to explain phenomena of consciousness, including dreaming, hypnosis, out-of-body experiences, and mystical experiences. Foundations of Consciousness provides an essential introduction to the scientific and philosophical approaches to consciousness for students in psychology, neuroscience, cognitive science, and philosophy. It will also appeal to those interested in the nature of the human soul, giving an insight into the motivation behind scientist's and philosopher's attempts to understand our place as conscious beings in the physical world.

In this book David Chalmers follows up and extends his thoughts and arguments on the nature of consciousness that he first set forth in his groundbreaking 1996 book, The Conscious Mind.

In this book, William Lycan defends an original theory of mind that he calls "homuncular functionalism." What is consciousness? The answer to this question has been pondered upon, grappled with, and argued about since time immemorial. There has never been an answer that achieved consensus; certainly philosophers have never agreed. In this book, William Lycan defends an original theory of mind that he calls "homuncular functionalism." He argues that human beings are "functionally organized information-processing systems" who have no non-physical parts or properties. However, Lycan also recognizes the subjective phenomenal qualities of mental states and events, and an important sense in which mind is "over and above" mere chemical matter. Along the way, Lycan reviews some diverse philosophical accounts of consciousness-including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Castañeda, among others-and demonstrates how what is valuable in each opposing view can be accommodated within his own theory. Consciousness is Lycan's most ambitious book, one that has engaged his attention for years. He handles a fascinating subject in a unique and undoubtedly controversial manner that will make this book a mainstay in the field of philosophy of mind. Consciousness, with these earlier works, is a Bradford Book.

The topic of personal identity has prompted some of the liveliest and most interesting debates in recent philosophy. In a fascinating new contribution to the discussion, Peter Unger presents a psychologically aimed, but physically based, account of our identity over time. While supporting the account, he explains why many influential contemporary philosophers have underrated the importance of physical continuity to our survival, casting a new light on the work of Lewis, Nagel, Nozick, Parfit, Perry, Shoemaker, and others. Deriving from his discussion of our identity itself, Unger produces a novel but commonsensical theory of the relations between identity and some of our deepest concerns. In a conservative but flexible spirit, he explores the implications of his theory for questions of value and of the good life.

This is a powerful guide for everybody who wants to make his dreams come true. In more than 20 lessons the reader is taught the way to success, wealth and power. Contents: Chapter One -

I Am Chapter Two - Consciousness Chapter Three - Power Of Assumption Chapter Four - Desire Chapter Five - The Truth That Sets You Free Chapter Six - Attention Chapter Seven - Attitude Chapter Eight - Renunciation Chapter Nine - Preparing Your Place Chapter Ten - Creation Chapter Eleven - Interference Chapter Twelve - Subjective Control Chapter Thirteen - Acceptance Chapter Fourteen - The Effortless Way Chapter Fifteen - The Crown Of The Mysteries Chapter Sixteen - Personal Impotence Chapter Seventeen - All Things Are Possible Chapter Eighteen - Be Ye Doers Chapter Nineteen - Essentials Chapter Twenty - Righteousness Chapter Twenty-One - Free Will Chapter Twenty-Two - Persistence Chapter Twenty-Three - Case Histories Chapter Twenty-Four - Failure Chapter Twenty-Five - Faith Chapter Twenty-Six - Destiny Chapter Twenty-Seven - Reverence

Cognition, Brain, and Consciousness Introduction to Cognitive Neuroscience Academic Press

What is the relationship between perception and action, between an organism and its environment, in explaining consciousness? This book is an interdisciplinary exploration of the relationship between perception and action, with a focus on the debate about the dual visual systems hypothesis, against action oriented theories of perception.

PSYCHOLOGY: THEMES AND VARIATIONS, 10th Edition, helps you experience the excitement of this fascinating field, while helping you study and retain what you learn. Filled with practical ways that you can apply psychology to your everyday life, this best-selling textbook is an experience in learning that you'll remember long after you complete your introductory psychology course. Critical Thinking Applications in every chapter give you specific critical thinking strategies you can apply in all of your courses and in your personal life. Reality Checks, many of which may surprise you, address common misconceptions about psychology. Every chapter of this book offers tools -- such as Concept Charts that provide colorful visual snapshots of key points -- to help you focus on what's important, showing you how to study in ways that help you retain information and do your best on exams.

Individual Differences in Conscious Experience is intended for readers with philosophical, psychological, or clinical interests in subjective experience. It addresses some difficult but important issues in the study of consciousness, subconsciousness, and self-consciousness. The book's fourteen chapters are written by renowned, pioneering researchers who, collectively, have published more than fifty books and more than one thousand journal articles. The editors' introductory chapter frames the book's subtext: that mind-brain theories embodying the constraints of individual differences in subjective experience should be given greater credence than nomothetic theories ignoring those constraints. The next five chapters describe research and theory pertaining to individual differences in conscious sensations — specifically, individual differences in pain perception, phantom limbs, gustatory sensations, and mental imagery. Then, two succeeding chapters focus on individual differences in subconsciousness. The final six chapters address individual differences in altered states of self-consciousness — dreams, hypnotic phenomena, and various clinical syndromes. (Series B)

Dreaming is the cognitive state uniquely experienced by humans and integral to our creativity, the survival characteristic that allows for the rapid change and innovation that defines our species and provides the basis for our art, philosophy, science, and humanity. Yet there is little empiric or scientific evidence supporting the generally accepted dream-based theories of neuroconsciousness. Dream Science examines the cognitive science of dreaming and offers an evidence-based view of the phenomenon. Today, such evidence-based breakthroughs in the field of dream science are altering our understanding of consciousness. Different forms of dreaming consciousness occur throughout sleep, and dreamlike states extend into wake. Each dream state is developed on a framework of memories, emotions, representational images, and electrophysiology, amenable to studies utilizing emerging and evolving technology. Dream Science discusses basic insights into the scientific study of dreaming, including the limits to traditional Freudian-based dream theory and the more modern evidence-based science. It also includes coverage of the processes of memory and parasomnias, the sleep-disturbance diagnoses related to dreaming. This comprehensive book is a scientific exploration of the mind-brain interface and a look into the future of dream science. Provides a more evidence-based approach than any other work on the market Single source of integrated information on all aspects of dream science makes this a critical time-saving reference for researchers and clinicians Authored by one of the leaders in the field of dream research

The Neuropsychology of Consciousness is based on a symposium entitled "Consciousness and Cognition: Neuropsychological Perspectives held at the University of St Andrews, September 1990. The intention was to assemble a group of the major researchers at the forefront of this field. The starting point for the symposium and for the book was the widespread realization that in several areas of human cognition (e.g. visual perception, memory, language comprehension, and attention), the severe and profound impairments due to brain damage that have been described over the past 150 years are often not absolute. In particular, the use of indirect methods of testing may reveal unsuspected preservation of capacities that are undetected by more traditional direct methods. The book opens with a discussion of the epidemic of dissociations and how well the phenomena within either neuropsychology or within normal human experimental psychology map onto each other. This is followed by separate chapters on topics such as blindsight, covert visual processing in patients, face recognition and awareness following brain injury, and the relationship between the study of attention and the understanding of consciousness.

The book offers a novel view of consciousness and its place in second language learning, using the established cognitive framework, MOGUL. It also provides an extensive review of theories of consciousness and related cognitive theory and research, placing that work in the context of second language learning.

What were the circumstances that led to the development of our cognitive abilities from a primitive hominid to an essentially modern human? The answer to this question is of profound importance to understanding our present nature. Since the steep path of our cognitive development is the attribute that most distinguishes humans from other mammals, this is also a quest to determine human origins. This collection of outstanding scientific problems and the revelation of the many ways they can be addressed indicates the scope of the field to be explored and reveals some avenues along which research is advancing. Distinguished scientists and researchers who have advanced the discussion of the mind and brain contribute state-of-the-art presentations of their field of expertise. Chapters offer speculative and provocative views on topics such as body, culture, evolution, feelings, genetics, history, humor, knowledge, language, machines, neuroanatomy, pathology, and perception. This book will appeal to researchers and students in cognitive neuroscience, experimental psychology, cognitive science, and philosophy. Includes a contribution by Noam Chomsky, one of the most cited authors of our time

A new edition of Wegner's classic and controversial work, arguing that conscious will simply reminds of us the authorship of our actions. Do we consciously cause our actions, or do they happen to us?

Philosophers, psychologists, neuroscientists, theologians, and lawyers have long debated the existence of free will versus determinism. With the publication of The Illusion of Conscious Will in 2002, Daniel Wegner proposed an innovative and provocative answer: the feeling of conscious will is created by the mind and brain; it helps us to appreciate and remember our authorship of the things our minds and

bodies do. Yes, we feel that we consciously will our actions, Wegner says, but at the same time, our actions happen to us. Although conscious will is an illusion (“the most compelling illusion”), it serves as a guide to understanding ourselves and to developing a sense of responsibility and morality. Wegner was unable to undertake a second edition of the book before his death in 2013; this new edition adds a foreword by Wegner's friend, the prominent psychologist Daniel Gilbert, and an introduction by Wegner's colleague Thalia Wheatley. Approaching conscious will as a topic of psychological study, Wegner examines cases both when people feel that they are willing an act that they are not doing and when they are not willing an act that they in fact are doing in such phenomena as hypnosis, Ouija board spelling, and dissociative identity disorder. Wegner's argument was immediately controversial (called “unwarranted impertinence” by one scholar) but also compelling. Engagingly written, with wit and clarity, *The Illusion of Conscious Will* was, as Daniel Gilbert writes in the foreword to this edition, Wegner's “magnum opus.”

Clinical practice related to sleep problems and sleep disorders has been expanding rapidly in the last few years, but scientific research is not keeping pace. Sleep apnea, insomnia, and restless legs syndrome are three examples of very common disorders for which we have little biological information. This new book cuts across a variety of medical disciplines such as neurology, pulmonology, pediatrics, internal medicine, psychiatry, psychology, otolaryngology, and nursing, as well as other medical practices with an interest in the management of sleep pathology. This area of research is not limited to very young and old patients—“sleep disorders reach across all ages and ethnicities. *Sleep Disorders and Sleep Deprivation* presents a structured analysis that explores the following: Improving awareness among the general public and health care professionals. Increasing investment in interdisciplinary somnology and sleep medicine research training and mentoring activities. Validating and developing new and existing technologies for diagnosis and treatment. This book will be of interest to those looking to learn more about the enormous public health burden of sleep disorders and sleep deprivation and the strikingly limited capacity of the health care enterprise to identify and treat the majority of individuals suffering from sleep problems.

Language lies at the heart of the way we think, communicate and view the world. Most people on this planet are in some sense multilingual. *The Multilingual Mind* explores, within a processing perspective, how languages share space and interact in our minds. The mental architecture proposed in this volume permits research across many domains in cognitive science to be integrated and explored within one explanatory framework, recasting compatible insights and findings in terms of a common set of terms and concepts. The MOGUL framework has already proven effective for shedding light on the relationship between processing and learning, metalinguistic knowledge, consciousness, optionality, crosslinguistic influence, the initial state, 'UG access', ultimate attainment, input enhancement, and even language instruction. This groundbreaking work will be essential reading for linguists working in language acquisition, multilingualism, language processing and for those working in related areas of psychology, neurology and cognitive science.

Consciousness has been described as one of the most mysterious things in the universe. Scientists, philosophers, and commentators from a whole range of disciplines can't seem to agree on what it is, generating a sizeable field of contemporary research known as consciousness studies. Following its forebear *Music and Consciousness: Philosophical, Psychological and Cultural Perspectives* (OUP, 2011), this volume argues that music can provide a valuable route to understanding consciousness, and also that consciousness opens up new perspectives for the study of music. It argues that consciousness extends beyond the brain, and is fundamentally related to selves engaged in the world, culture, and society. The book brings together an interdisciplinary line up of authors covering topics as wide ranging as cognitive psychology, neuroscience, psychoanalysis, philosophy and phenomenology, aesthetics, sociology, ethnography, and performance studies and musical styles from classic to rock, trance to Daoism, jazz to tabla, and deep listening to free improvisation. *Music and Consciousness 2* will be fascinating reading for those studying or working in the field of musicology, those researching consciousness as well as cultural theorists, psychologists, and philosophers.

In this fascinating new collection, an all-star team of researchers explores lucid dreaming not only as consciousness during sleep but also as a powerful ability cultivated by artists, scientists, and shamans alike to achieve a variety of purposes and outcomes in the dream. • Presents a variety of expert perspectives on lucid dreaming from many different cultures that represent a breadth of disciplinary perspectives • Provides theoretical models that integrate scientific reason, mysticism, and individuals' experiences, making way for a new level of sophistication in the study of lucid dreaming • Offers practical insights for therapists, teachers, and researchers as well as students and scholars of psychology, anthropology, and religious studies while containing accessible information and compelling personal narratives that will appeal to general readers

Bernard Baars suggests a way to specify empirical constraints on a theory of consciousness by contrasting well-established conscious phenomena with comparable unconscious ones, such as stimulus representations known to be preperceptual, unattended or habituated. By adducing data to show that consciousness is associated with a kind of workplace in the nervous system, Baars helps clarify the problem.

"This book is designed to help students organize their thinking about psychology at a conceptual level. The focus on behaviour and empiricism has produced a text that is better organized, has fewer chapters, and is somewhat shorter than many of the leading books. The beginning of each section includes learning objectives; throughout the body of each section are key terms in bold followed by their definitions in italics; key takeaways, and exercises and critical thinking activities end each section"--BCcampus website.

Summary for *Light of Consciousness* Metaphysics is a controversial subject because its concepts are not the same as and do not follow the same process of thinking as in other subjects. To think metaphysically, one must “think out of the box”; one must think independently of empirical objects, and this has to be learned. Here, one separates objective experiences from those occurring independently of objects. Such thinking or experiences are unusual, and are different from everyday thinking processes. Otherwise, one does not differentiate characteristics one ascribes to absolute intelligence (God) from those ascribed to objects. Empiricists may insist there is no such thing as an experience independent of an object; but they do not explain the objects if any that one perceives, conceives and represents as time, space or self consciousness. In *Critic of Pure Reason*, Kant (1781-1787) sees nature as subject to necessary law. These laws, Kant would say are accessible to us because cognition of these laws depends on the subject of thinking who characterizes perceptions of nature according to rules. The problem that arises from this way of framing subjective and objective relationship is answering the question, “what and how a subject must be in order to operate as a part of or apart from nature and still be said to determine it?” Kant's answer to this dilemma is to split nature into objective and intelligible (object and things as they are in themselves) realm; however, he does not explain how the intelligible, independent of thinking, connects with the objective realm; that is, how an object determines another. In view of these problems, *Light of Consciousness* is intended to achieve two main goals; (1) in chapter one, we attempt to point out the cognition with its elements in virtue of which Metaphysics may also ascend its throne as a legitimate subject matter. Here, just as cognition of external object is cognition of objective relations or physics, the object of cognition in metaphysics consist of a subject (an aspect) of inner sense saddled with the task of thinking, and therefore not objective. A main problem of Metaphysics is that a subject of inner sense is empirical; therefore no experience no subject of inner sense. In other words, without experience there is no subject of inner sense or self; but what about the fact that there is a consciousness that something is occurring? Is not that enough justification to claim a consciousness of "ground" independent of an object? *Light of Consciousness* answers this question affirmatively; this book addresses problems related to claim of "Ground" not merely by declaring its existence, but also by

pointing out instances of its occurrence in our experiences. In the other chapters of the book, we attempt to analyze other important and related topics of metaphysics, and to show how these topics help to further simply the subject matter. We describe these various aspects of the subject matter of metaphysics and point out how they relate to self. Specifically, we explicate and seek to establish that the process involved when one "stands away" from thinking is a real activity unique to the human being. In the chapter of time and space, we attempt to explicate its constituents as they relate to self. In the chapter on Monad, we went further to establish the natures of primary elements of nature, by explicating a process of development of pure and objective consciousness and their processes. Finally, in the chapters on consciousness and thought, we attempt to describe and explicate elements, constitution and process of operations of pure and objective consciousness. Here, we explain what consciousness is, what it consists of. Most important, we attempt to identify the nature of a consciousness in virtue of which one determines a representation of time and space, and to differentiate this from a consciousness in virtue of which one determines and represents an object in time.

There has been an explosion of work on consciousness in the last 30–40 years from philosophers, psychologists, and neurologists. Thus, there is a need for an interdisciplinary, comprehensive volume in the field that brings together contributions from a wide range of experts on fundamental and cutting-edge topics. The Routledge Handbook of Consciousness fills this need and makes each chapter's importance understandable to students and researchers from a variety of backgrounds. Designed to complement and better explain primary sources, this volume is a valuable "first-stop" publication for undergraduate or graduate students enrolled in any course on "Consciousness," "Philosophy of Mind," or "Philosophy of Psychology," as well as a valuable handbook for researchers in these fields who want a useful reference to have close at hand. The 34 chapters, all published here for the first time, are divided into three parts: Part I covers the "History and Background Metaphysics" of consciousness, such as dualism, materialism, free will, and personal identity, and includes a chapter on Indian philosophy. Part II is on specific "Contemporary Theories of Consciousness," with chapters on representational, information integration, global workspace, attention-based, and quantum theories. Part III is entitled "Major Topics in Consciousness Research," with chapters on psychopathologies, dreaming, meditation, time, action, emotion, multisensory experience, animal and robot consciousness, and the unity of consciousness. Each chapter begins with a brief introduction and concludes with a list of "Related Topics," as well as a list of "References," making the volume indispensable for the newcomer and experienced researcher alike.

In this dissertation, I examine the nature and structure of consciousness. Conscious experience is often said to be phenomenally unified, and subjects of consciousness are often self-conscious. I ask whether these features necessarily accompany conscious experience. Is it necessarily the case, for instance, that all of a conscious subject's experiences at a time are phenomenally unified? And is it necessarily the case that subjects of consciousness are self-conscious whenever they are conscious? I argue that the answer to the former is affirmative and the latter negative. In the first chapter, I set the stage by distinguishing phenomenal unity from other species of conscious unity. A pair of conscious states is phenomenally unified if they are experienced together as part of a single experience that encompasses them both. In this and the next two chapters I defend the thesis that, necessarily, for any subject (of conscious mental states) at any time, all of that subject's conscious mental states (at that time) are part of a single, maximal state of consciousness. I call this thesis the "Unity Thesis." I proceed by considering some preliminary questions that might be raised about the Unity Thesis. For instance, the thesis presupposes that it is coherent to talk about parts of mental states. I consider objections by Tye and Searle and argue that the notion of an experiential part is unproblematic. In the remaining pages of the chapter, I present the source of the biggest challenge to the Unity Thesis: the data gathered from split-brain subjects. The Unity Thesis is formulated using the notion of a maximal state of consciousness. In the second chapter, I attempt to precisify this notion in a way that does not pre-emptively decide the debate over the Unity Thesis. In informal terms, a maximal state of consciousness is a sum of conscious states that are i) simultaneous, ii) have the same subject, and iii) all have a conjoint phenomenology. I call this the Consensus View. I then consider two unorthodox views that the Consensus View does not take off the table: the views that a "collective consciousness" and a "spread consciousness" are possible. A collective subject is one that can enjoy the experiences of an indeterminate number of "lesser" subjects of consciousness by sharing them together with those subjects. A spread subject is one that can enjoy the experiences of an indeterminate number of lesser subjects of consciousness, but it does so, not by sharing those experiences with the lesser subjects, but by absorbing the lesser subjects of experience into itself, thereby erasing the traditional boundaries between the entities we intuitively think of as subjects of experience. I argue that, although the Consensus View does not decide against them, these views stretch the bounds of coherence and should not, therefore, be accepted. Having presented an account of what maximal state of consciousness is, I define a stream of consciousness in terms of a maximal state of consciousness. In the rest of chapter two, I consider and argue against a number of different ways of interpreting the split-brain data that are either inconsistent with the Unity Thesis or attribute more than one subject of consciousness to split-brain subjects. Among the views I consider are Lockwood's partial-unity view and the views, by theorists such as Sperry, Koch, Puccetti, Marks, and Tye, that split-brain subjects have two non-overlapping streams of consciousness. In chapter three, I consider a recent attempt by Bayne to account for the split-brain data in a way that does not attribute two streams of consciousness to them. According to Bayne's Switch Model, the consciousness of split-brain subjects can be likened to that of a ball that is passed back and forth between the two hemispheres of the upper-brain. The hemispheres take turns supporting a single stream of consciousness. I consider the empirical data in some detail and argue that the data is not as compatible with the Switch Model as Bayne claims. I close the chapter by presenting the rough outline of an interpretation of the split-brain data that is consistent with both the Unity Thesis and the split-brain data. In chapter four, I turn from defending the Unity Thesis to examining an attempt to account for conscious unity. Rosenthal has offered a theory of conscious unity as an extension of his higher-order theory of consciousness. I consider his account of conscious unity in light of a well-known objection to his theory: the (Representational) Mismatch Objection. It can be asked what it is like for a subject of experience when a higher-order state misrepresents its target first-order state. If what it is like for the subject corresponds to the content of the higher-order state, then it appears as though higher-order representation is unnecessary for conscious experience, for it would appear as though it is possible for a state to be conscious without being represented by a higher-order state. If what it is like corresponds to the content of the lower-order state, then it would again seem as though representation at the higher-order level is unnecessary for conscious experience, for the higher-order state would not seem to be doing any work in generating the experience. I consider and argue against two recent defences of Rosenthal's higher-order theory from the Mismatch Objection. Then I turn to Rosenthal's account of conscious unity. Rosenthal's account posits two mental mechanisms. I refer to the ways of accounting for conscious unity via these two mechanisms as the "gathering strategy" and the "common-ascription strategy" respectively. Both of these strategies, I argue, appear to locate the basis for certain phenomenal facts in higher-order representational facts. This raises a *prima facie* question: does Rosenthal's account of conscious unity land him square within the sights of the Mismatch Objection? Although the gathering strategy may ultimately be understood in a way that does not make it subject to the Mismatch Objection, Rosenthal has certain commitments that bar this strategy from serving as a complete account of conscious unity. This is problematic for Rosenthal, I argue, because his common-ascription strategy faces some difficult questions. This strategy makes conscious unity due to an implicit expectation a subject of consciousness has that, whenever he or she engages in introspection, an explicit sense of conscious unity will be generated. I argue that it is very difficult to see how such an implicit sense could both avoid the Mismatch Objection and do the work it needs to do in order to account for conscious unity. In chapter five, the discussion turns from the unity of consciousness to self-consciousness. The question that is considered in this and the last chapter is the question whether conscious experience is necessarily accompanied by self-consciousness. The affirmative answer to this question I call the Ubiquity Thesis. I

spend some time distinguishing robust conceptions of self-consciousness from minimal conceptions of self-consciousness. The notion of self-consciousness invoked by the Ubiquity Thesis is a minimal one. In spite of the fact that the Ubiquity Thesis invokes only a minimal or thin conception of self-consciousness, I believe the thesis to be false and argue against it. In this chapter I take up the views of Husserl. Husserl is often regarded as the progenitor of the phenomenological tradition, a tradition in which many philosophers affirm the Ubiquity Thesis. I examine and argue against an interpretation of Husserl's work, one defended by Zahavi, according to which Husserl could be seen to defend the Ubiquity Thesis. One claim that Husserl makes is that, in order for an object to become the intentional target of a conscious state, it must be given to consciousness beforehand. It is possible, during acts of deliberate introspection, for consciousness to take itself as its object. On Husserl's view, this requires consciousness to be given to itself beforehand. This self-giveness of consciousness, argues Zahavi, can be seen as a kind of minimal self-consciousness. Husserl has also offered an account of this self-giveness of consciousness and it appears in his discussion of inner time-consciousness. I attempt to argue, using some of Husserl's other views regarding psychological stances (or standpoints), that consciousness is not given to itself outside of the adoption of a certain psychological standpoint. I also offer an alternative way of accounting for inner time-consciousness, one that does not have, as a built-in feature, that consciousness always has itself as a secondary object. In the sixth and final chapter, I take up a contemporary defence of the Ubiquity Thesis. Kriegel, a higher-order theorist like Rosenthal, has argued that every conscious state is conscious in virtue of the fact that it represents itself. This self-representation is understood as a kind of self-consciousness and, thus, his theory can be seen as affirming the Ubiquity Thesis. In the first part of the chapter, I take issue with the way in which Kriegel lays out the conceptual terrain. In particular, Kriegel countenances a property he calls "intransitive state self-consciousness." I argue that this way of speaking is confused. I then turn to considering Kriegel's account. Kriegel identifies the species of self-consciousness that pervades all of conscious experience with a peripheral awareness of one's own mental states. I argue that such a peripheral inner awareness does not accompany all of our mental states and, thus, that Kriegel's views do not give us reason to accept the Ubiquity Thesis.

To make the journey into the Now we will need to leave our analytical mind and its false created self, the ego, behind. From the very first page of Eckhart Tolle's extraordinary book, we move rapidly into a significantly higher altitude where we breathe a lighter air. We become connected to the indestructible essence of our Being, "The eternal, ever present One Life beyond the myriad forms of life that are subject to birth and death." Although the journey is challenging, Eckhart Tolle uses simple language and an easy question and answer format to guide us. A word of mouth phenomenon since its first publication, *The Power of Now* is one of those rare books with the power to create an experience in readers, one that can radically change their lives for the better.

In this book Fabian Klinge develops a novel approach for explaining phenomenal consciousness. He defends a version of panpsychism, that is the theory, that (some of) the fundamental physical entities exhibit consciousness. However, in contrast to standard conceptions of the view, the author does not take human consciousness to be grounded in but emergent from the consciousness of elementary particles. In this form, he argues, panpsychism can overcome the doctrine's Achilles' heel, the combination problem, without running into similarly severe problems—thus rendering panpsychism a strong contender to its problem-ridden rivals physicalism and dualism. In addition, the author provides a thorough analysis of the poorly studied concept of metaphysical emergence. He argues that, by refining some of the major contributions in the literature, emergence can be made intelligible enough to serve as a basis for a credible solution proposal to the mind-body problem.

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